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A MONTHLY
FOR INDEPENDENT AND
PEACEFUL UNIFICATION

100 YEN

ONE KOREA



☆☆☆ Outline of Korean Question in UN

☆☆☆ Minjok Ilbo Case

☆☆☆ Socialist Given Death

☆☆☆ Unification Advancing in Japan

NO. 4

OCT. 1, 1961

Special Edition
featuring
Korean Question in U.N.

Our Aims and Demands

Liberation from Japanese Imperialism did not bring complete freedom and independence to Korea. Instead, the Big Powers of the world split the Korean territory and nation into two countries. And to this day, the Korean people have been suffering for sixteen long years under the most piteous and distressing conditions. Not only have we constantly wandered on the brinks of death, pressed by poverty and oppression, but we at last had to commit the most shameful mistake in our history: Incited by foreign powers, we Koreans engaged ourselves in the horrible task of killing our own brothers during that tragical Korean War. Yet, in spite of all these sufferings and injustices, the Korean people obediently held trust in the good faiths of the Big Powers, and solely believed that they would carve out the future of Korea for us.

But today we have finally realized our stupidity. We know well now that we must carve out our own destiny with our own hands, that is, the Korean nation must realize unification of Korea by the nation's own powers if it is willing to live. And the people's uprising in April last year which overthrew that most atrocious government of all times, the Syngman Rhee regime, without borrowing any aid from others, has given us the confidence that we can accomplish this aspiration.

We, as members of the Korean nation and campaigners for the unification movement, urged by such consciousness and confidence, propose here that our Independent and Peaceful Unification shall commence by conducting mutual contact and exchange between the North and South Korean people. Whereby, we are sure, brotherly love will be renewed and North and South negotiations invited; thus enabling concrete plans for unification to be worked out. We also believe that the unification must be not only the unification of the Korean territories but also of the divided nation. And in order to reflect the true will of the entire nation on the unification, we call for a Free General Elections to be held throughout North and South Korea; and through these elections, a Unified Central Government shall be established. From these standpoints, we demand:

1) *To immediately open up exchanges of letters, civilian travel, culture and trade between North and South Korea.*
2) *To convene at once an All-Korea Conference represented by delegates from the Governments, political parties and civil organizations of both Koreas, to study and work out the measures for preparing the All-Korea General Elections and establishing the Unified Central Government.*

We are convinced that these demands are fully legitimate, equitable and just since they are based on the standpoints of humanity, fundamental rights and the principle of self-determination. Still we cannot ignore the bearings which the Korean Unification problem has on the international relations. Thus emphasizing the original mission of the United Nations; respecting the authority of the 1954 Geneva Conference in which both the North and South Korean Delegations had participated, and acknowledging adoption of the Agreements reached at the said Conference, we request the nations concerned:

1) *To call as soon as possible an International Conference that shall further the accomplishments of the Political Conference on the Korean Question held at Geneva in 1954, and accelerate the Korean unification by assisting the independent unification movements of the Korean people.*
   Besides those nations which participated in the 1954 Conference, delegations from the four nations constituting the Korean Armistice Observation Commission (Switzerland, Sweden, Poland and Czechoslavakia) and India shall participate in the proposed Conference.
2) *All nations participating in this International Conference shall assume the responsibility to secure the peace in the Korean Peninsula and to guarantee the peaceful development of Unified Korea.*
   In order to secure these guarantees, the United States, the Soviet Union and all other countries shall immediately stop supplying weapons and all other military aids to the present Governments of North and South Korea; shall pledge to assist in the reconstruction of Korea on conditions of non-intervention in her internal affairs and also not to utilize Unified Korea as military bases; and shall recommend immediate membership of Unified Korea to the United Nations.
3) *The same nations shall also support, when requested, the projects of the Unification Projects Agency which will be established by tne All-Korea Confererecce, and also set up an International Supervision Commission to supervise the All-Korea General Elections which will be administered by the above Agency.*
   The International Supervision Commission shall be formed by nations that did not participate in the Korean War, but elected by the participating nations in the proposed International Conference and confirmed by the United Nations.
4) *The foreign armed forces stationed in Korea shall be replaced by International Police Forces ana evacuate Korea as soon as possible.*
   The International Police Forces shall be organized by troops from nations that did not participate in the Korean War; shall have missions to maintain the peace in Korea and also to secure an atmosphere in which free and fair elections can be enforced; and shall withdraw from Korea when requested by the Unified Korea Government.

Unification of Korea is a matter of life and death to the Korean people. No one, no nation should be allowed to bar our way. Therefore, we here appeal to the world to understand and to extend its support to our aims and demands.

ONE KOREA

A MONTHLY MAGAZINE OF NEWS AND VIEWS ON KOREAN UNIFICATION MOVEMENTS

Oct. 1, 1961 Vol. 4

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A Word for "One Korea"

UN MUST SOLVE KOREAN QUESTION AT ONCE

As always the Korean Question is included in the 90 or so items listed in the agenda of the coming U.N. General Assembly. Something really has to be done about the Question this time. The Question came up in the Political Committee last April but had to be posponed without going into the substantial matters as the 15th session ran out of its time limit. The General Assembly must hold serious discussions in the coming session, if ever; for, the situation in Korea renders it highly imperative. The United Nations can, in no ways, ignore the deplorable reality in South Korea where the legitimate ROK government which the U.N. Forces and the UNCURK (United Nations Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea) stationed there should have safeguarded, was taken over by the May 16th coup d'etat and a dictatorship is being built up by the militarists.

To our great regrets, however, prospects that debates on the Korean Question might not be held during the coming session are getting stronger. The grounds given are: firstly, issues of world-wide scope and urgency are so crowded that the Assembly will not have time to take up the Korean issue, and secondly, the United States, which is placed in an embarrassing spot of having so undemocratic government in South Korea, supported by its allies, is reportedly maneuvering to keep the Question from being presented to the Assembly rostrum.

Returning to the very outset of the Korean Question, it must be recalled that broad skepticism was cast on the suitability of the United Nations as the proper ground to seek the resolution of the Korean Question. And ever since the United States presented the issue before the world organization back in 1947, the United Nations has up to this date hardly succeeded in producing any effective result towards a positive solution of the issue. It is perhaps needless to put forward legal contentions by quoting Article 107 of the U.N. Charter and to assert the irrevelance of the United Nations handling the Korean Question. The fact that the United Nations has virtually shelved the Korean Question in its storeroom for 14 long years is enough to point out its past impotency to resolve the issue.

BREACH OF TASKS

But things weren't limited to mere shelving of the problem. In 1948, the U.N., contrary to its initial policy of reunifying Korea, enforced the establishment of a separate government in South Korea which, consequently, perpetuated the division of the country. Then, in 1950, against its innate mission to always act as peaceful arbitrator, the United Nations degraded itself down to the position of an opponent in the Korean War. Furthermore, the U.N., in 1953, sent its representative to sign and confirm the Panmunjom Armistice Agreement which agreed on convening a a political conference represented by both sides to negotiate on the terms of the withdrawal of foreign armed forces and peaceful resolution of the Korean Question, but did not maintain this line to find a final solution of the problem at the Geneva Political Conference of 1954 and gave up solution of this knotty problem to the discretion of the United Nations. This inconsistent attitude has been the major cause of prolonging resolution of Korean unification till this date.

In the meantime, just what did the UNCURK and the U.N. Forces, the two U.N. agencies in Korea, do during the 12 years of Syngman Rhee rule? The UNCURK, in total neglect of its orginal tasks to "remove barriers to economic, social and other friendly intercourse caused by the division of Korea" and to "cooperate and consult with in order to develop a representative government based on the freely-expressed will of the electorate", had constantly given helping hands to justify Rhee's undemocratic and anti-unification policies. The U.N. Forces, too, worked more in the direction of strengthening Rhee's dictatorship than to serve as champions of freedom.

Now look what the U.N. Forces have done when ROK forces under U.N. control, overthrew the legitimate government "lawfully established through the free will of the people" and safeguarded by the U.N. And note what the UNCURK has done when the militarists wrongfully arrested, imprisoned and given death sentences to advocators of unification who had so faithfully worked in line with the U.N. policy to "remove barriers to economic, social and other friendly intercourse." These two agencies of the United Nations have not only let such obvious mutiny against the U.N. go by but have been desperately trying to cover up and even justify such activities that have clearly trampled on the U.N. resolutions!

DO NOT MAKE LIGHTLY OF THE KOREAN QUESTION

In this manner, the U.N. is offering a cloak under which the militarists are hiding. It must be noted that the U.N. is thus piling additional sufferings on the Korean people. The actions totally defy the Purposes and Spirit of the United Nations and also the Korean resolutions adopted by the U.N.

It is truly strange that the Korean Question has not as yet made any substantial step towards solution despite being included year after year in the General Assembly agenda. During the 15th session, the Assembly could not go into discussion on substantial matters. The reason was that other pending issues had to be given priority.

Must the Korean Question always be treated so lightly? Must Koreans suffer indefinitely due to the negligence of the United Nations and lose their chances of reunifying the nation and go on tolering the fetters put on by dictatorships? No matter what the United Nations has to

say, it is unexcusable whatsover for the U.N. to neglect this life-and-death problem of the Korean people any more.

An intrigue is reportedly going on in face of such urgency. The ROK military regime and a number of Western powers is said to be pushing forth a plan to shelve the Korean Question again. The intrigue by gaining time through shelving of the Question, aims at getting the military regime established in South Korea and attaining international recognition for that government. And, moreover, the hidden aim behind the maneuvering is to urge the military government to step up its anti-Communist policy; perpetuate the division of Korea and even intensify world tension. These forces are said to have been desparately working to ward off in advance the attacks they will be dealt at the coming session and also the demands that will arise to straighten the distorted situation in South Korea. The General Assembly must not allow such sabotage and permit postponement of the Korean debate. If it should do so, that would not only be turning one's eyes away from the miseries and predicaments of the Korean people but would also be an act against the very basic task of the U.N. on which the organization itself is built on.

U.N. MUST TAKE IMMEDIATE MEASURES

From this standpoint and in this spirit, we demand the following: The General Assembly must, at all costs, discuss the Korean Question at once and cut open a way to its resolution. And for this, the U.N. must, first, take firm measures to straighten the abnormal situation now prevailing in South Korea. The U.N. need not give heed to criticisms of "intervention"; for, the coup was staged by ROK forces under U.N. control in defiance of the original mission designated to the U.N. Forces and the UNCURK to look after the peace and democratic development of Korea. So, the General Assembly should work in the direction to dissolve the present ROK military government which would be a proper reprimand on the mutiny committed by the ROK forces against the United Nations. Such action, at the same time, will reestablish the morale of the U.N. Forces. The United Nations should also release all wrongfully arrested persons beginning with the unification advocators and restore a democratic government in Korea which is but a measure faithfully carrying out the U.N. resolutions on Korea.

Following these normalization measures, the present U.N. Forces stationed in Korea must be replaced by "International Police Forces" made up of troops from nations that did not take part in the Korean War. And it is also necessary to abolish the UNCURK. These actions are just and proper in view of all the failures committed by these two U.N. agencies during the past and particularly their bungling of matters in the event of the recent South Korean coup d'etat.

Then the General Assembly must contrive steps to convene, as soon as possible, an international conference similar to the 1954 Geneva Political Conference which included Communist China, for the purpose of finding a way for an independent unification of Korea. This is the only way by which the U.N. can, under the circumstances, compensate for all the miseries and distresses it has caused on the Korean nation due to its 14 years' negligence of the Korean Question.

We are, however, quite aware that the U.N. is no longer an arena for the Big Powers to utilize for their propagnanda purposes. We are looking forwards to the coming session with great hopes and must here ask the United Nations and its members to hammer out an agreeable and rapid resolution of the ever-prolonging Korean Question.

OUTLINE OF KOREAN UNIFICATION QUESTION IN U.N.

Fourteen years have gone by since the Korean Question was presented to the United Nations back in 1947, but the Question is still sleeping on the shelves of the General Assembly without any positive results towards solution. And now, there are rumors that the UNCURK has prepared its annual report on Korea in such manner as to get the debates on the Question postponed. But, the Assembly is obliged to resume its Korean Debate carried over from the previous session, and the Korean nation, placed in the worst predicament since Liberation, is looking forward with great expectations to the U.N. to solve the problem during the coming session. In view of this situation, we have traced, once more, what the U.N. has done in relation to the Korean unification issue to this date in order to show the urgency and gravity of the problem.

I. U.S.-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS

Liberation. Korean liberation struggle rose and fell with the tides throughout the 40 long years of Japanese rule but could not cut loose the chains of colonialism until Japan was defeated by the Allied Nations on August 15, 1945. Independence for the Korean people was first stated in the Cairo Declaration, then confirmed in the Potsdam Declaration and finally accepted by the Japanese through the signing of the surrender documents.

The Cairo Declaration was issued after the heads of the 3 major Allied Powers, the United States, United Kingdom and China (Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Chang Kai-Shek) discussed top political and military strategy against Japan from Nov. 23 to 27 of 1943 at Cairo. In this declaration, the three nations decided to "give independence and freedom to Korea after the termination of the war, minding the servile state of the Korean people." This decision was accepted later by Russia at the Yalta Conference held in February, 1945.

In July of 1945, the United States, United Kingdom and China proclaimed the Potsdam Declaration and called on Japan to surrender unconditionally which was finally accepted on Aug. 15. The Potsdam Declaration covered the decisions of the Cairo Declaration by defining that Japan shall accept the Cairo Declaration, which cut Japanese territories down to the four islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu and Shikoku plus other small islands to be determined by the Allied Nations and obliged the Japanese to give up Korea.

38th Parallel Line 13 days after the proclamation of the Potsdam Declaration, Soviet Russia, in accords with the Yalta Agreement, declared war on Japan and, at the same time, joined the Potsdam Declaration. On Aug. 12, Soviet forces already pushed in to Korea, whereas U.S. advanced forces had only reached as far as Okinawa. The United States, hurriedly proposed that, in the event of Japanese surrender, Russia should be in charge of disarming the Japanese armed forces stationed in Korea north of the 38th parallel and the U.S. should disarm those south of that line. This proposal was immediately accepted by Stalin. (Source: U.S. State Department White Book on Korea) This agreement was confirmed in the surrender documents and reiterated in the Allied Commander's directive No. 1 that dealt with the measures for surrender and armistice.

In this way, the division of Korea at the 38th parallel was originally but a tentative step to meet with the Japanese surrender. The U.S. vs. Soviet cold war that imme-

diately set in, however, changed the parallel into an outpost line of both forces and, consequently, into an iron curtain dividing the East-West blocs.

Tri-Power Moscow Conference. Japan's surrender brought World War II to an end. In Dec. of 1945, the foreign ministers of the United States, United Kingdom and the Soviet Union gathered at Moscow and discussed on matters dealing with the post-war world. And the three ministers reached the following agreement on the formula for realizing independence of Korea:

1) With a view to the re-establishment of Korea as an independent state, the creation of conditions for developing the country, democratic principles and the earliest liquidation of the disastrous result of protracted Japanese domination in Korea, there shall be set up a provisional Korean democratic government which shall take all the necessary steps for developing the industry, transportation, agriculture as well as the national culture of the Korean people.

2) In order to assist the formation of a provisional Korean government and with a view to the preliminary elaboration of the appropriate measures, there shall be established a Joint Commission consisting of representatives of the U.S. command in southern Korea and the Soviet command in northern Korea. The proposals to be prepared by the Commission shall be submitted for consideration of the Governments of the U.S., United Kingdom, U.S.S.R. and China prior to final decision by the two governments represented in the Commission.

3) It shall be the task of the Joint Commission with the participation of the provisional Korean democratic government and the Korean democratic organizations to work out measures also for helping and assisting the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of th national independence of Korea. The proposals of the Joint Commission shall be submitted, following consultation with the provisional Korean government, for the joint consideration of the Governments of the U.S., U.S.S.R., United Kingdom and China for the working out of an agreement concerning a four-power trusteeship of Korea for a period of up to five years.

4) For the consideration of urgent problems affecting both southern and northern Korea and for the elaboration of measures establishing permanent coordination in administrative-economic matters between the U.S. command in southern Korea, a conference of the U.S. and Soviet commands in Korea shall be convened within a period of two weeks.

The tri-power Moscow Agreement, therefore, determined the interim measures to prepare for the independence of Korea through set-up of a provisional government under a four-power trusteeship to be worked out by a Joint Commission of representatives from the U.S. and Soviet commands in Korea. The Agreement also fixed the relative positions which the four powers of the U.S., U.S.S.R., United Kingdom and China should occupy in relation to treatment of Korea.

U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission. In accords with the Moscow Agreement, the U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission commenced its meetings on January 16, 1946 in Seoul. Besides a brief recess, negotiations continued to May 8 but as both sides did not yield in their stands, the Commission was adjourned indefinitely without producing any concrete results.

The U.S.-Soviet controversy was over the category of the "democratic organizations to be consulted." The trusteeship formula agreed at the Moscow Conference was supported by North Korean parties and progressive forces of South Korea but conservative politicians of South Korea opposed the plan. In view of this local reaction, the Russians insisted on selecting only those organizations in support of the trusteeship. To this, the Americans opposed on grounds that such a selection

would mean a violation of freedom of speech and persisted that all organizations should be allowed participation so long as they were willing to cooperate in setting up the provisional government.

So, the Commission went into a long recess until the spring of 1947. In April of that year, U.S. Secretary of State General Marshall and Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov met at the Berlin Foreign Ministers' Conference to discuss the German Peace Treaty and after exchange of a number of letters, agreed to re-open the Joint Commission.

The Commission was re-convened on May 21, 1947 and through mutual compromise, differences were adjusted and an agreement was reached to invite participation of "democratic organizations and political parties" from July 5 as consultants in the establishment of the provisional government. But, the U.S. and the Soviets differed on the scale of the political parties this time, and the negotiations went up on the rocks again.

II. U.N. ACTIONS

Presentation of the Problem to the U.N. In view of the stalemate, the United States submitted the problem of Korean independence to the U.N. General Assembly. On Sept. 17, 1947, second day of the second Session of the General Assembly, the U.S. announced its plan to present the problem to the U.N. and the proposal was adopted in its agenda by the Assembly on the 23rd of the same month. The U.S. plan proposed a U.N. supervised general elections and withdrawal of U.S. and Soviet armed forces from Korea following the establishment of a democratic Korean government. (Prior to this, the Soviet Union suggested a plan to establish a Korean government through the independent actions of the Korean people and to immediately withdraw U.S. and Soviet armed forces from that area.) The U.S. proposal was discussed in the Political Committee from Oct. 28 of that year. The U.S., in the meantime, proposed an indefinite adjournment of the Joint Commission, whereby, the Soviet delegation left Seoul. So, the Korean Question was transferred to the United Nations.

General Assembly's Resolution No. 1 on Korea. The General Assembly adopted its first resolution on Korea on Nov. 14, 1947 by a vote of 43 nations in favor, none against and 6 abstaining. This resolution became the first international agreement that affected the future course of Korea. (Full text is listed at end of this article)

1) A United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea shall be established constituted by 9 nations of Australia, Canada, China, El Salvador, France, India, Philippines, Syria and Ukraina.

2) Elections shall be held throughout Korea under the observation of the Temporary Commission to choose representatives who will constitute a National Assembly and also establish a National Government of Korea;

3) The National Assembly shall convene as soon as possible after the elections and form a National Government and notify the Commission of its formation;

4) The Government, in consultation with the Commission shall: (a) constitute its own national security forces and dissolve all military or semi-military formations not included therein; (b) take over the functions of government from the military commands and civilian authorities of north and south Korea, and (c) arrange with the occupying Powers for the complete withdrawal from Korea of their armed forces as early as practicable and if possible within ninety days;

5) The Commission shall report, with its conclusions, to the General Assembly and may consult with the Interim Committee (if one be established) with respect to the application of this resolution in the light of developments.

Soviet Russia and the socialist countries did not approve of this resolution and ab-

stained from voting, and Ukraina which was elected to the Interim Committee refused participation.

Set-up of the U.N. Temporary Commission on Korea. The Temporary Commission on Korea arrived in Seoul on Jan. 8, 1948 and began operations. But, Soviet Russia which had opposed set-up of the Commission for the reason that it was established without participation of the Korean people in the General Assembly, refused admittance of the Commission into North Korea. So, on Feb. 6, the Commission consulted the Interim Committee which, subsequently, decided on implementing the Assembly's programme in such parts of Korea as were accessible to the Commission. Canada and Australia opposed this decision on grounds that such action would not only be a breach of the Assembly's resolution but finalize the division of Korea. The Assembly had resolved to enforce a U.N. supervised all-Korea elections and to establish a unified Korean Government which obviously excluded seperate elections and seperate governments.

Nevertheless, seperate elections in the U.S. occupied South Korea were enforced on May 10, 1948 in accords with the decision of the Interim Committee.

Opposition to these seperate elections was not limited to the progressive forces in South Korea. Bulk of the conservatives, led by such powerful politicians like Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-Shik, refused participation for the reason that the elections would perpetuate the division of Korea. Thus, only the Korean Democratic Party (predecessor of the Liberal Party) which was but a minor landed class party led by Syngman Rhee, and a handful of independents entered the elections. Despite such circumstances, the elections were totally rigged with interventions by the security authorities and bribery and violence by the Democratic Party, which made entire abuse of the United Nations supervision.

Representatives elected through these rigged elections gathered on May 31 to form the new National Assembly which elected Syngman Rhee as Speaker and launched its work to draft the Constitution.

The Constitution Drafting Committee of the National Assembly unanimously approved adoption of a "responsible cabinet system" as the suitable form of government. But meeting the blunt refusal of Rhee, had to revise it overnight and, consequently a freak presidential form of government built on top of a "responsible cabinet" came into being. The Constitution which ordained vast powers, unparalleled in any democratic system, to a single person, was promulgated on July 12 immediately after approval of the National Assembly. Then on July 20, Syngman Rhee was elected as President by the Assembly and the establishment of the Republic of Korea was officially proclaimed on August 15.

In face of such developments in South Korea, a seperate government (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) was formed in North Korea on Sept. 9. The Temporary Commission rendered a report on these developments to the 3rd session of the General Assembly which commenced in September.

Resolution No. 2 and Activities of the U.N. Commission. The 3rd session of the General Assembly referred the Temporary Commission's report to the Political Committee for discussion on Sept. 14, 1948. The Committee, on Oct. 6, after disapproving the Czekoslavakian plan to invite North Korean participation in its debate on the Korean Question by a vote of 34 to 6 and 8 abstaining, approved instead the Chinese resolution to invite South Korean delegation to participate without vote in the debate.

On Dec. 8, the Political Committee approved the Temporary Commission's report and after refusing the Soviet plan which called for terminating Temporary Commission's operations in Korea and immediately withdrawing all occupation forces

from North and South Korea by a vote of 43 to 6 and 3 abstaining, adopted the joint resolution sponsored by the United States, Australia and China which proposed forming a new U.N. Commission on Korea.

This joint resolution was recommended to the General Assembly which approved it on Dec. 12 by a vote of 48 to 6 and 1 abstaining. This General Assembly resolution no. 195 is generally considered a formal recognition of Korea by the United Nations. The contents are as follows: (For full text, see end of this article)

The General Assembly

1) Declares that there has been established a lawful government having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the Temporary Commission was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of all Korea reside; that this Government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such Government in Korea;

2) Recommends that the occupying Powers should withdraw their occupation forces from Korea as early as practicable;

3) Resolves that, as a means to the full accomplishment of the objectives set forth in the resolution of 14 November 1947, a Commission on Korea consisting of Australia, China, El Salvador, France, India, the Philippines and Syria, shall be established having the following tasks: (a) To bring about the unification of Korea and the integration of all Korean security forces; (b) Seek to facilitate the removal of barriers to economic, social and other friendly intercourse caused by the division of Korea; (c) Be available for observation and consultation in the further development of representative government based on the freely-expressed will of the people, and (d) Observe the actual withdrawal of the occupying forces and verify the fact of withdrawal;

4) The Commission is authorized to travel, consult and observe throughout Korea and may consult with the Interim Committee;

5) The Commission shall render a report to the next regular session of the General Assembly and to any prior special session which might be called to consider the subject-matter of the present resolution, and shall render such interim reports as it may deem necessary to the Secretary-General for distribution to Members.

The new Commission held its first meeting in Seoul on Feb. 2, 1949, but besides confirming the withdrawal of the U.S. occupation forces from South Korea, could not enforce any of its tasks assigned by the Assembly. Although Soviet forces had evacuated North Korea during 1948, the Commission was again refused admission to North Korea which disabled it to confirm the withdrawal of the Soviet occupation forces. The Commission's interim report which covered the period between Jan. and July, 1949, was thus, not anything encouraging. The report summed up the situation in the following tone:

1) Malicious propaganda and antagonistic actions between north and south are making unification ever remote.

2) If new efforts are not made in order to bring the U.S. and the Soviets agree on the Korean Question, unification of Korea based on the principles set by the U.N. General Assembly cannot be expected.

3) It must be stressed that the situation in Korea has not improved and no progress has been gained towards the goals set by the Assembly.

North-South Tension Intensifies and Adoption of U.N. Resolution No. 3. In face of the little progress gained in the Commission's projects, the situation in Korea grew so bad as to make the Commission sigh in its interim report that the antagonistic actions between North and South Korea have rendered chances of unification ever remote. After receipt of the Commission's report describing the abominable situation, the 4th session of the Gen-

eral Assembly which opened in Sept., 1949, referred the Korean Question to its Political Special Committee. The Committee held five sessions on the Question from Sept. 28 to Oct. 3. The East and West powers clashed head on from the very outset of the debates in regards to the question of inviting North and South Korean representatives. Two rival plans, the Philippine proposal to invite only South Korea without voting rights and the Soviet plan to invite North Korea alone were put to vote on Sept. 29 of which the Committee approved the Philippine proposal by a vote of 42 to 6 and 5 abstaining and rejected the Soviet plan by a vote of 35 to 7 and 12 abstaining. By the way, it should be noted that countries like France and Syria belonging to the Free World, suggested inviting North Korean representatives as well as South Koreans provided that North Korea recognize the U.N. Commission on Korea or as individuals.

The Committee, subsequently, held discussions on the 15 Nation Joint Resolution sponsored by such nations as China, for continuation of the U.N. Commission's operations. The Soviet Union submitted a counter-proposal that requested immediate termination of the U.N. Commission on Korea and self-determination for the Korean people. Votes were cast on the two resolutions on Oct. 3, and the 15 Nation Joint Resolution alone was adopted after one ammendment was made on the draft proposal which replaced Syria with Turkey as member of the Commission.

The Joint Resolution was recommended to the General Assembly where heated arguments ensued between the Western powers led by the U.S. and Nationalist Chinese delegates and the Socialist Nations. The U.S. delegate asserted the necessity of continuing and strengthening the work of the U.N. Commission on Korea in order to terminate the artificial division of North and South Korea and to eliminate the threats on peace and security in the Far East. The Soviet delegate retaliated that the reason why the U.S. was trying to draw the United Nations into Korea was because the U.S. did not want to shoulder alone the liabilities of having so unstable a state prevailing in South Korea and stressed that rejection of all foreign intervention was the only way by which a unified, democratic Korean government can be realized.

After such heated debates, the General Assembly adopted the Joint Western Resolution recommended by the Political Special Committee on Oct. 21 by a vote of 48 to 6 and 3 nations abstaining. This resolution (General Assembly Resolution no. 293) was virtually the same as the resolution (No. 195) adopted in the previous session except on two points: Turkey became a new member of the Commission in place of Syria and and a new task was added for the Commission "to observe and report any developments which might lead to conflict in Korea" in view of the frequent clashes that erupted between North and South Korea. (See U.N. General Assembly resolution No. 293 listed at end of this article)

In the meantime, the governments of the Republic of Korea and North Korea both applicated for U.N. membership on Jan. 7 and Feb. 9. 1949., respectively, but both applications were turned down by the Security Council.

III. KOREAN WAR AND GENEVA CONFERENCE

Outbreak of the Korean War, and Despatch of U.N. Forces to Korea. Inspite of the mission assigned to the U.N. Commission to observe the dangers of armed collision breaking out in Korea, tensions at the 38th parallel where heavily armed North and South Korean units confronted each other, grew with the moment. And, finally, at pre-dawn hours of June 25, 1950, war broke out at the parallel, and the belligerent actions developed into one of the brutalist warfares in history.

As soon as war broke out, the Security Council gathered in emergency to review the situation. Meetings were held on the 25th (actually on the 26th according to Korean Time), 27th, and furthermore on July 7th and 31st which worked out a number of resolutions to meet the emergency. According to the resolutions of June 27 and July 7, the United Nations Forces constituted by troops from Free countries and under U.S. command were despatched to Korea. (These Security Council resolutions on despatchment of U.N. Forces to Korea and the authenticity of the U.N. Forces later became issues of bitter controversy but will not be treated here as such problems will be off the main course of this discourse.)

These Security Council resolutions were swiftly passed during the aperture of Soviet absence from the Council due to the well-known controversy over National Chinese representation in the Council. On the other hand, the United States tended to go beyond the limits set by the Security Council resolutions. The Council, in its resolutions, had only demanded the North Korean authorities to withdraw their forces back of the 38th parallel and requested the U.N. Korean Commission to recommend the withdrawal of North Korean forces. But, the United States had already decided to send troops to Korea as early as June 27. So, there may be grounds for the criticisms that the Security Council resolutions of June 27 and July 7 were but ex post facto recognitions of the U.S. decision to send its troops to Korea.

Then on Oct. 7, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the socalled "Korean Peace Plan." Although this resolution merely resolved "to contrive such appropriate steps to insure conditions of stability throughout Korea," it was utilized as a shield for the U.N. Forces to cross the 38th parallel into North Korea. This crossing into North Korea brought about the participation of Communist Chinese Voluntary Forces, which eventually, expanded the warfare, which had started as a conflict between North and South Korea, into a big-scaled international belligerence.

Meanwhile, the United States and Soviet Russia were engaged in bitter verbal wars in the General Assembly forum. The U.S. accused North Korea as the party solely responsible for the war and branded it as aggressor; whereas the Soviet Union argued that the Korean War was merely a civil strife whereby all foreign interventions should be rejected and asserted the invalidity of the U.N. resolutions on Korea. Such bitter arguments went on in face of the tragical war posing dangers of developing into a world conflict.

At any rate, the debates on the Korean Question during this period were centered solely on the means of bringing the war to a close. There is, however, one point notable here: The General Assembly adopted another resolution on Korea on Oct. 17, 1950, by which the U.N. Commission was reorganized into the U.N. Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) with Australia, Chile, Netherlands, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand and Turkey as member nations and an additional task "to execute the responsibilities in respect to relief and reconstruction of Korea to be decided by the General Assembly at the recommendation of the Economic and Social Council" was assigned to the new Commission.

Panmunjom Armistice Agreement. Pressed by the Communist Chinese forces, the U N. Forces had to retreat from North Korea and the warfare came to a stalemate around the 38th parallel which gave signs of the war to prolong forever. Frequent calls for armistice arose from neutral quarters of the world which reflected on the United Nations and on June 23, 1950, Soviet representative to the U.N. Malik suggested, through a New York broadcast that negotiations be opened between the belligerents. This proposal eventually led the waring nations to open truce talks on July 10th. And after 2 weary, long years of turns and twists, the Armistice Agreement was finally signed on July

27, 1953 at Panmunjom, by the representatives of both the U.N. Forces and Chinese-Korean Forces. The representatives, in signing this pact, agreed in Par. 60 of Article 4 of the Armistice Agreement to convene a political conference of a higher level for the purposes of deciding on the terms of the withdrawal of foreign armed forces and of seeking a peaceful resolution of the Korean Question. Peaceful resolution of the Korean Quetsion naturally meant peaceful realization of Korean unification. The United Nations General Assembly, through its resolution on Aug. 28 (General Assembly Resolution No. 711), confirmed this Armistice Agreement and, especially, welcomed the agreement on convening of a political conference and recommended the participation of both Koreas, the 16 nations that contributed troops to the U.N. Forces plus U.S.S.R. in the conference.

The central point of the Korean Question once again became focused on the unification problem and the stage to get the problem resolved was assigned to this political conference agreed on by both camps and sanctioned by the United Nations. But meeting obstructions by the ROK government which had bitterly opposed signing the Truce Agreement and the dubious attitude of the United States, the conference could not get under way neither within the 3 months set by the Armistice Agreement nor before the deadline of Oct. 28 fixed by the U.N. resolution and postponement followed postponement.

Geneva Political Conference. In view of such prolonging, the foreign ministers of France, United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union who gathered on Feb. 18, 1954 in Berlin for the four-power conference, decided to convene the political conference, agreed in the Truce Pact at Geneva. And so, nine months after the signing of the Armistice, the political conference was finally opened on April 26, 1954, participated by delegations from both North and South Korea, the 16 nations which sent troops to the U.N. Forces, Communist China and the Soviet Union. Despite the tense atmosphere that reigned at the conference, both sides offered considerable compromises which brought about such agreements as enforcement of an all-Korea simultaneous free elections. But being unable to reach agreements on two vital points of evacuating the foreign armed forces and the form of election supervision, the conference adjourned in failure. The Communist nations insisted on continuing the negotiations until final solution of the problem but the Western powers proclaimed further negotiations useless and announced the conference dead.

IV. RETURN TO UNITED NATIONS

Return of the Korean Question to the U.N. The 16 nations that contributed forces to the U.N. Command, after proclaiming termination of the Conference, submitted a "Report on the Korean Political Conference at Geneva" to the U.N. Secretary General on Nov. 11, 1954, in pursuance to the requirements set by the General Assembly resolution of August 28, 1953. This report was affirmed by the General Assembly resolution on Dec. 11, 1954 whereby the Korean unification problem was returned and tied to the U.N. again.

In the subsequent years, the Korean Question was always included in the General Assembly agenda and the UNCURK's annual report was received each year but hardly any positive measures on the unification problem could be decided on and the Question was always carried over to the next regular session. An event encouraging to the causes of unification came up in 1958 when the Chinese Communist forces completed evacuation of North Korea. Still, the U.N. did not avail itself of the opportunity to take concrete measures for stepping up resolution of the problem. A part of the participant nations in the U.N. Forces, represented by the United Kingdom, however, sent three notes to the Com-

munist Chinese government in connection with Korean problem on April 9, June 2 and Dec. 5 of 1958, but could not attain any results. So, 6 years went by without a step gained towards the goal.

Invitation of North Korean Delegation. Contrary to the inactivity on the part of the U.N., aspirations for unifications within the Korean nation mounted with the times. And following the April uprisings of 1960 and the subsequent downfall of the Syngman Rhee government, voices calling for "independent and peaceful unification" which aimed at gaining unification through the nation's own power without foreign assistance and also through mutual negotiations, rung throughout the Korean peninsula. These powerful demands arising from the nation's true consciousness drew immediate reactions abroad. The aspirations of the Korean nation at first gained the sympathy and support of these newly borne nations admitted to the U.N. in recent years. These small nations bound by common destiny, sentiment and interests have gained strong voices in the world organization and have become fresh advocates of the oppressed and world conscience. And through their voices, support of all the conscientious nations of the world has been won over for the Korean rights to self-determination.

The Korean debate in the 15th session of the General Assembly held in such atmosphere was a matter of great concern to the world. And rightfully, the debate did not wind up in mere postponement of the Question to the next session as before. This change in course was brought about in connection with the question of inviting Korean representatives to the debate. The Western powers, led by the United States, originally planned to invite only the participation of South Korean delegation as previously. But shift in the balance of power in the world organization no longer allowed this heretofore unreasonableness of inviting only one party concerned in the issue to have its way.

Thus, U.S. chief delegate Adlai Stevenson proposed on April 12, 1961 in the Political Committee of the resumed General Assembly 15th session, to invite North Korean representatives also provided they accept "the competence and authority of the United Nations." This U.S. resolution was adopted by the Committee on the following day by a vote of 59 to 14.

The U.S. move, of course, did not mean that the U.S. welcomed North Korean participation. On the contrary, it was considered a counter-measure to prevent North Korea coming to the U.N. But such is not our major concern here. The important point is the changes that have occurred in the United Nations and the international situation that urged the U.S. to present such a proposal.

Although the North Korean government expressed its regrets on the condition attached to the invitation, it accepted the proposal on April 17 through a statement issued by its foreign minister. Since North Korean delegation, the other party concerned, decided to participate in the U.N. debate, prospects for resolution of the Korean unification problem grew. But, unfortunately, the General Assembly, crowded by other urgent and major issues, had to adjourn without holding substantial discussions on the Korean Question. The Political Committee, after rejecting the U.S. proposal to hold discussions on the UNCURK's annual report and also to hear a speech by ROK foreign minister Chyung Yil-Hying who was standing by in New York, approved the Committee chairman's move to postpone and give priority to the Korean Question in the next session and went into adjuornment. So, the debate on the Korean Question was carried over to the 16th session.

Takeover of the ROK Government by Military Coup. A serious incident involving not only the Korean unification problem but the United Nations as well broke out in South Korea. On May 16, ROK forces under the U.N. Command staged a coup d'etat and took over the legitimate Chang Myun government which the

U.N. had recognized through its resolutions and had also assisted and safeguarded through its two agencies in Korea, namely, the U.N. Forces and the UNCURK. The coup forces have set up a most undemocratic and dictatorial regime and are enforcing a reign of terror. And above everything, they have, at last, rapped death sentences on those advocators of "independent and peaceful unification" who have but faithfully promoted the policies of the United Nations symbolized in the tasks assigned to the UNCURK "to facilitate the removal of barriers to economic, social and other friendly intercourse caused by the division."

It must be said that the activities of the coup forces are not only obvious breaches on the U.N. resolutions (See General Assembly resolutions No. 195, 293s and 376 at end of this article) but also constitute downright mutiny against the United Nations. It must also be noted that the recent South Korean coup differs basically with those coups staged in other countries, since the United Nations was there to look after the legitimate government and the U.N. cannot avoid its liabilities by using "non-intervention in internal affairs" as a shield.

Intrigue to Postpone Korean Debate. The fact that the U.N. agencies in Korea have not taken responsible actions against the coup and its aftermath is being pointed out as truly strange. The U.N. Command did not take a single effective measure to reprimand those leaders of the coup for their breakaway from the command. The UNCURK, in neglect of its tasks to promote the unification of Korea and to assist in its democratic progress, did not take one step to counter the actions of the coup forces which were obvious outrages against its basic tasks. On the contrary, the UNCURK not only has shown appeasement towards the military government but it has even been giving helping hands to put cloaks of legality on that government.

When the UNCURK met in full session in June to prepare its annual report, one of its members declared that the UNCURK was working in the direction to recommend the U.N. General Assembly to pospone its debate on the Korean Question. This statement immediately drew criticisms of an international intrigue being schemed. The UNCURK's aim, reportedly, is to gain time for the ROK military govtrnment so that it can get itself established as a fait accompli through posponement of the Korean debate. The intrigue is said to have originated in face of the possibility that the liabiilties of the UNCURK and the U.N. Forces in inviting such a coup will be questioned by the General Assembly together with the legality of the ROK military government in case the Korean Question should come up in the next session.

Reports from U.N. sources say that this maneuver to keep the Korean Question from getting into the Assembly is being stepped up on the back stage. In view of the tense atmosphere surrounding the U.N. hemmed in by such world-wide issues as the Berlin crisis and the U.S. vs. Soviet nuclear test race, the odds on the intrigue succeeding is considered big, but reports also tell us that neutral Asian nations are taking actions to ward off such intrigue and to get the Question on the Assembly rostrum.

V. COMMENTS

We have thus reviewed the U.N. actions taken on the Korean unification problem since 1947 to this date. In short, the 14 years have virtually ended in "mistakes and failures." There can be given two major reasons which have caused the United Nations to take such a course. The first reason is because the U.N. had, instead of working in the direction to resolve the Korean unification problem in line with its innate mission based on the Spirit and Purposes of the United Nations, always intervened in Korean internal affairs being utilized as a ground for West vs. East

cold war politics. The second reason is because the U.N. had, instead of putting stress on the interests of the Korean nation, only minded the interests of the Big Powers which have controlled the world organization. It was, therefore, impossible to expect due resolution of the Korean question under such circumstances.

Now, what were the "mistakes and failures" of the U.N.? Let us review these points once more and summarize them here.

1. Violation of the U.N. Charter. A mistake was committed from the very beginning. The U.N. General Assembly's decision to take up the U.S. proposal to place the Korean Question on its agenda on Sept. 23, 1947, constituted a clear violation of Article 107 of the U.N. Charter which stipulated that all problems connected with the post-war treatment of the enemy should not be referred to the U.N. but be resolved by the Allied Nations themselves.

2. Violation of U.N. Resolution. Next, the enforcement of the seperate elections in South Korea on May 10, 1948 by the U.N. Temporary Commission on Korea and the subsequent establishment of the seperate government, was an obvious violation of the U.N. General Assembly resolution as duly pointed out by Australia and Canada two member states of the Commission at that time. It was contended that the Temporary Commission had consulted the Interim Committee on Feb. 26, 1948 and only followed the Committee's decision, but the Interim Committee itself was only a tentative organ set up by the General Assembly whereby possessing no authority to alter the General Assembly resolution.

3. Violation of the Truce Agreement. Following the unilateral termination of the Geneva Political Conference on Korea by the 16 participant nations in the U.N. forces, and transfer of the Korean Question back to the U.N., the 9th session of the General Assembly worked in such a way to tie the Question up with the U.N. This was a violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement signed by the U.N. Commander on July 27, 1953 at Panmunjom and confirmed by the General Assembly in its own resolution of August 28, 1953. It should be recalled that a political conference of representatives from both sides was agreed on to ensure the peaceful settlement of the Korean Question in paragraph 60 of Article 4 of the Truce Agreement and any revision or termination of the terms of the Agreement must be agreed on by both sides was defined in its Article 5.

4. Breach of Tasks. The two U.N. organs in Korea, the U.N. Forces and the UNCURK, have not faithfully executed their tasks. It can be said that these agencies have, in place of fulfilling their basic tasks to safeguard the peace and stability in Korea, promote peaceful unification of Korea and assist in developing a democratic Korean government, always served as guardians of ROK governments that have indulged in intensifying tensions between North and South Korea, obstructing peaceful unification and strengthening dictatorships.

5. Neglect and Indolence. The last point we must stress is the trend of neglect and indolence showing in the process of United Nations' (General Assembly, the Secretariat and all U.N. organs concerned with the Korean Question) past treatment of the Korean Question. It must be noted that 14 years have passed since the Question was referred to the U.N. and 7 years have gone by since the Question was returned to the U.N. following the failure of the Geneva Conference. The way in which the Korean Question was treated in the previous session of the General Assembly is a good example too. Inspite of the chances of getting a way cut open towards resolution thanks to the North Korean decision to participate in the U.N. debate, the General Assembly, without holding any discussion on the substantial matters of the issue, carried the Question over to its next session. Such attitudes are clear evidences of unjust negligence and

unwarrantable indolence in the treatment of the Korean unification problem.

These criticisms on the U.N. may be too severe. But they are, in no ways, meant to ignore or abuse the United Nations. On the contrary, we fully recognize the United Nations as the only present world organ that can promise the mankind of its future and sincerely wish its proper development, whereby we are requesting a just solution of the Korean unification question.

Fortunately, the United Nations of today is no longer the United Nations of yesterday that was a tool monopolized by certain Big Powers for their cold war purposes. It is transforming into a real arbitrator for peaceful resolution of world issues based on the ideals and conscience of mankind. And as a natural course of events, the other party concerned in the Korean issue, North Korea, is slated to send its delegation to participate in the Korean debate of the coming General Assembly. It is the sincere desire of the Korean nation that the unification problem be treated justly in the coming session.

U.N. RESOLUTIONS ON KOREA

The following are full texts of the major U.N. resolutions on Korea:

RESOLUTIONS OF THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY ESTABLISHING THE U.N. TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON KOREA AND PROVIDING FOR A PROGRAM FOR KOREAN INDEPENDENCE, Nov. 14, 1947 (General Assembly resolution 112 (II) and so-called U.N.'s official recognition of Korean Unification)

A

Inasmuch as the Korean question which is before the General Assembly is primarily a matter for the Korean people itself and concerns its freedom and independence, and

Recognizing that this question cannot be correctly and fairly resolved without the participation of representatives of the indigenous population,

The General Assembly

1. Resolves that elected representatives of the Korean people be invited to take part in the consideration of the question;

2. Further resolves that in order to facilitate and expedite such participation and to observe that the Korean representatives are in fact duly elected by the Korean people and not mere appointees by military authorities in Korea, there be forthwith established a United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, to be present in Korea, with right to travel, observe and consult throughout Korea.

B

The General Assembly,

Recognizing the urgent and rightful claims to independence of the people of Korea;

Believing that the national independence of Korea should be reestablished and all occupying forces then withdrawn at the earliest practicable date;

Recalling its previous conclusion that the freedom and independence of the Korean people cannot be correctly or fairly resolved without the participation of representatives of the Korean people, and its decision to establish a U.N. Temporary Commission on Korea (Hereinafter called the "Commission") for the purposes of facilitating and expediting such participation be elected representatives of the Korean people,

1. Decides that the Commission shall consist of representatives of Australia, Canada, China, El Salvador, France, India, Philippines, Syria, Ukranian Soviet Socialist Republic;

2. Recommend that the elections be held not later than 31 March 1948 on the basis of adult suffrage and by secret ballot to choose representatives with whom the Commission may consult regarding the prompt attainment of the freedom and independence of the Korean people and which re-

presentatives, constituting a National Assembly, may establish a National Government of Korea. The number of representatives from each voting area or zone should be proportionate to the population, and the elections should be under the observation of the Commission;

3. Further recommends that as soon as possible after the elections, the National Assembly should convene and form a National Government and notify the Commission of its formation;

4. Further recommends that immediately upon the establishment of a National Government, that Government should, in consultation with the Commission: (a) constitute its own national security forces and dissolve all miiltary or semi-military formations not included therein: (b) take over the functions of government from the military commands and civilian authorities of north and south Korea, and (c) arrange with the occupying Powers for the complete withdrawal from Korea of their armed forces as early as practicable and if possible within ninety days;

5. Resolves that the Commission shall facilitate and expedite the fulfillment of the foregoing programme for the attainment of the national independence of Korea and withdrawal of occupying forces, taking into account its observations and consultations in Korea. The Commission shall report, with its conclusions, to the General Assembly and may consult with the Interim Committee (if one be established) with respect to the application of this resolution in the light of development;

6. Calls upon the Member States concerned to afford every assistance and facility to the Commission in the fulfillment of its responsibilities;

7. Calls upon all Members of the United Nations to refrain from interfering in the affairs of the Korean people during the interim period preparatory to the establishment of Korean independence, except in pursuance of the decisions of the General Assembly; and thereafter, to refrain completely from any and all acts derogatory to the independence and sovereignty of Korea.

RESOLUTION OF THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY ESTABLISHING THE U.N. COMMISSION ON KOREA, Dec. 12, 1948 (General Assembly resolution 195 (III))

The General Assembly,

Having regard to its resolution 112 (II) of 14 November 1947 concerning the problem of the independence of Korea,

Having considered the report of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (hereinater referred to as the "Temporary Commission"), and the report of the Interim Committee of the General Assembly regarding its consultation with the Temporary Commission,

Mindful of the fact that, due to difficulties referred to in the report of the Temporary Commission, the objectives set forth in the resolution of 14 November 1947 have not been fully accomplished, and in particular that unification of Korea has not yet been achieved,

1. Approves the conclusions of the reports of the Temporary Commission;

2. Declares that there has been established a lawful government (the Government of the Republic of Korea) having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the Temporary Commission was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of all Korea reside; that this Government is based on the elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such Government in Korea;

3. Recommends that the occupying Powers should withdraw their occupation forces from Korea as early as practicable;

4. Resolves that, as a means to the full accomplishment of the objectives set forth in the resolution of 14 November 1947, a Commission on Korea consisting of Australia, China, El Salvador, France, India, the Philippines and Syria, shall be established to continue the work of the Temporary Commission and carry out the provisions of the present resolution, having in mind the status of the Government of Korea as herein defined, and in particular to:

(a) Lend its good offices to bring about the unification of Korea and the integration of all Korea security forces in accordance with the principles laid down by the General Assembly in the resolution of 14 Nov-

ember 1947;

(b) Seek to facilitate the removal of barriers to economics, social and other friendly intercourse caused by the division of Korea;

(c) Be available for observation and consultation in the further development of representative government based on the freely expressed will of the people;

(d) Observe the actual withdrawal of the occupying forces and verify the fact of withdrawal when such has occurred; and for this purpose, if it so desires, request the assistance of military experts of the two occupying Powers;

5. Decides that the Commission:

(a) Shall, within thirty days of the adoption of the present resolution, proceed to Korea, where it shall maintain its seat;

(b) Shall be regarded as having superseded the Temporary Commission established by the resolution of 14 November 1947;

(c) Is authorized to travel, consult and observe throughout Korea;

(d) Shall determine its own procedures;

(e) May consult with the Interim Committee with respect to the discharge of its duties in the light of developments, and within the terms of the present resolutions;

(f) Shall render a report to the next regular session of the General Assembly and to any prior special session which might be called to consider the subject-matter of the present resolution, and shall render such interim reports as it may deem appropriate to the Secretary General for distribution to Members;

6. Requests that the Secretary General shall provide the Commission with adequate staff and facilities, including technical advisers as required; and authorizes the Secretary-General to pay the expenses and per diem of a representative and an alternate from each of the States members of the Commission;

7. Calls upon the Member States concerned, the Government of the Republic of Korea, and all Koreans to afford every assistance and facility to the Commission in the fulfillment of its responsibilities;

8. Calls upon Member States to refrain from any acts derogatory to the results achieved and to be achieved by the United Nations in bringing about complete independence and unity of Korea;

9. Recommends that Member States and other nations, in establishing their relations with the Government of the Republic of Korea, take into consideration the facts set out in paragraph 2 of the present resolution.

RESOLUTION OF THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEFINING RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE U.N. COMMISSION ON KOREA, October 21, 1949 (General Assembly resolution 293 (IV))

The General Assembly,

Having regard to its resolutions 112 (II) of 14 November 1947 and 195 (III) of 12 December 1948 concerning the problem of the independence of Korea.

Having considered the report of the United Nations Commission on Korea, and having note of the conclusions reached therein,

Mindful of the fact that, due to the difficulties referred to in the report of the Commission, the objectives set forth in the resolutions referred to have not been fully accomplished, and in particular, that the unification of Korea and the removal of barriers to economic, social and other friendly intercourse caused by the division of Korea have not yet been achieved,

Having noted that the Commission has observed and verified the withdrawal of United States occupation forces, but that it has not been accorded the opportunity to observe or verify the reported withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces,

Concerned lest the situation described by the Commission in its menace the safety and well-being of the Republic of Korea and of the people of Korea and lead to open military conflict in Korea,

1. Resolves that the United Nations Commission on Korea shall continue in being with the following membership: Australia, China, El Salvador, France, India, Philippines and Turkey and, having in mind the objectives set forth in the General Assembly resolutions of 14 November 1947 and 12 December 1948 and also the status of the Government of the Republic of Korea as defined in the latter resolution, shall;

(a) Observe and report any developments which might lead to or otherwise involve military conflict in Korea;

(b) Seek to facilitate the removal of

barriers to economic, social and other friendly intercouse caused by the division of Korea; and make available its good offices and be prepared to assist, whenever in its judgment a favorable opportunity arises, in bringing about the unification of Korea in accordance with the principles laid down by the General Assembly in the resolution of 14 November 1947;

(c) Have authority, in order to accomplish the aims defined under the sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of the present paragraph, its discretion to appoint observers, and to utilize the services and good offices of one or more persons whether or not representatives on the Commission;

(d) Be available for observation and consultation throughout Korea in the continuing development of representative government based on the freely-expressed will of the people, including elections of national scope;

(d) Verify the withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces in so far as it is in a position to do so;

2. Decides that the Commission:

(a) Shall meet in Korea within thirty days from the date of the present resolution;

(b) Shall continue to maintain its seat in Korea;

(c) Is authorized to travel, consult and observe throughout Korea;

(d) Shall continue to determine its own procedures;

(e) May consult with the Interim Committee of the General Assembly (if it be continued) with respect to the discharge of its duties in the light of development and within the terms of the present resolution;

(f) Shall render a report to the next regular session of the General Assembly and to any prior special session which might be called to consider the subject matter of the present resolution, and shall render such interim reports as it may deem appropriate to the Secretary-General for transmission to Members;

(g) Shall remain in existence pending a new decision by the General Assembly;

3. Calls upon Member States, the Government of the Republic of Korea, and all Koreans to afford every assistance and facility to the Commission in the fulfillment of its responsibilities, and to refrain from any acts derogatory to the purposes of the present resolution;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the Commission with adequate staff and facilities, including technical advisers and observers as required; and authorizes the Secretary-General to pay the expenses and per diem of a representative and an alternate from each of the States members of the Commission and of such persons as may be appointed in accordance with paragraph 1 (c) of the present resolution.

RESOLUTION OF THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY RECOMMENDING MEASURES FOR KOREAN UNIFICATION AND ESTABLISHING THE U.N. COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA, October 7, 1950 (General Assembly resolution 376 (V))

The General Assembly,

Having regard to its resolutions of 14 November 1947 (112 (II)), of 12 December 1948 (195 (III)) and of 21 October 1949 (293 (IV)),

Having received and considered the report of the United Nations Commission on Korea,

Mindful of the fact that the objectives set forth in the resolutions referred to above have not been fully accomplished and, in particular, that the unification of Korea has not yet been achieved, and that an attempt has been made by an armed attack from North Korea to extinguish by force the Government of the Republic of Korea,

Having in mind that United Nations armed forces are at present operating in Korea in accordance with the recommendations of the Security Council on 27 June 1950, subsequent to its resolution of 25 June 1950, that Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area,

Recalling that the essential objective of the resolutions of the General Assembly referred to above was the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government of Korea,

1. Recommends that

(a) All appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea;

(b) All constitutent acts be taken, including the holding of elections, under the auspices of the United Nations, for the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government in the sovereign state of Korea;

(c) All sections and representative bodies of the population of Korea South and North, be invited to co-operate with the organs of the United Nations in the restoration of peace, in the holding of elections in the establishment of a unified government;

(d) United Nations forces should not remain in any part of Korea otherwise than so far as necessary for achieving the objectives specified in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above;

(e) All necessary measures be taken to accomplish the economic rehabilitation of Korea;

2. Resolves that

(a) A Commission consisting of Australia, Chile, Netherlands, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand and Turkey, to be known as the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, be established to (i) assume the functions hitherto exercised by the present United Nations Commission on Korea; (ii) represent the United Nations in bringing about the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government of all Korea; (iii) exercise such responsibilities in connexion with relief and rehabilitation in Korea as may be determined by the General Assembly after receiving the recommendations of the Economic and Social Council. The United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea should proceed to Korea and begin to carry out its functions as soon as possible;

(b) Pending the arrival in Korea of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, the governments of the States represented on the Commission should form an Interim Committee composed of representatives meeting at the seat of the United Nations to consult with and advise the United Nations Unified Command in the light of the above recommendations; the Interim Committee should begin to function immediately upon the approval of the present resolution by the General Assembly;

(c) The Commission shall render a report to the next regular session of the General Assembly and to any prior special session which might be called to consider the subject-matter of the present resolution, and shall render such interim reports as it may deem appropriate to the Secretary-General for transmission to Members;

The General Assembly furthermore,

Mindful of the fact that at the end of the present hostilities the task of rehabilitating the Korean economy will be of great magnitude,

3. Requests the Economic and Social Council ,in consultation with the specialized agencies, to develop plans for relief and rehabilitation on the termination of hostilities and to report to the General Assembly within three weeks of the adoption of the present resolution by the General Assembly;

4. Also recommends the Economic and Social Council to expedite the study of long-term measures to promote the economic development and social progress of Korea, and meanwhile to draw the attention of the authorities which decide requests for technical assistance to the urgent and special necessity of affording such assistance to Korea;

5. Expresses its appreciation of the services rendered by the members of the United Nations Commission on Korea in the performance of their important and difficult task;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea with adequate staff and facilities, including technical advisers required; and authorizes the Secretary General to pay the expenses and per diem of a representatives and alternate from each of the States members of the Commission.

RESOLUTION OF THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE CONVENING OF A POLITICAL CONFERENCE ON KOREA PURSUANT TO THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, August 28, 1953 (General Assembly resolution 711)

A

Implementation of Paragraph 60 of the Korean Armistice Agreement

The General Assembly

1. Notes with approval the Armistice Agreement concluded in Korea on 27 July

1953, the fact that the fighting has ceased, and that a major step has thus been taken towards the full restoration of international peace and security in the area;

2. Reaffirms that the objectives of the United Nations remain the achievement by peaceful means of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area;

3. Notes the recommendation contained in the Armistice Agreement that "In order to ensure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military Commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three (3) months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed rspectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc";

4. Welcomes the holding of such a conference;

5. Recommends that:

(a) The side contributing armed forces under the Unified Command in Korea shall have as participants in the conference those among the Member States contributing armed forces pursuant to the call of the United Nations which desire to be represented, together with the Republic of Korea. The participating governments shall act independently at the conference with full freedom of action and shall be bound only by decisions or agreements to which they adhere;

(b) The United States Government, after consultation with the other participating countries referred to in sub-paragraph (a) above, shall arrange with the other side for the political conference to be held as soon as possible, but not later than 28 October, 1954, at a place and on a date satisfactory to both sides;

(c) The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall, if this is agreeable to both sides, provide the political conference with such services and facilities as may be feasible;

(d) The Member States participating pursuant to sub-paragraph (a) above shall inform the United Nations when agreement is reached at the conference and keep the United Nations informed at other appropriate times;

6. Reaffirms its intention to carry out its programme for relief and rehabilitation in Korea, and appeals to the governments of all Member States to contribute to this task.

B

The General Assembly,

Having adopted the resolution entitled "Implementation of paragraph 60 of the Korean Armistice Agreement,"

Recommends that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics participate in the Korean political conference provided the other side desires it.

C

The General Assembly,

Requests the Secretary-General to communicate the proposals on the Korean question submitted to the resumed meetings of the seventh session and recommended by the Assembly, together with the records of the relevant proceedings of the General Assembly, to the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and to the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea and to report as appropriate.

KOREAN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT

(Signed on July 27, 1953)

Article 4

(60) Recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three (3) months after the Armistice is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean Question.

(61) Any revision or supplement on the terms of the Agreement requires the mutual agreement of the commanders of both sides.

(62) The terms of Agreement shall remain in force until substituted by revision or supplement accepted by both sides or by proper agreements reached through the political conference of a higher lever represented by both sides.

(63) All the provisions of this Armistice Agreement (excluding paragraph 12 of this Article) shall come into force at 22.00 hours of July 27, 1953.

MINJOK ILBO CASE

MOST BRUTAL ASSAULT ON PRESS

The Revolutionary Court's trial and verdicts on the Minjok Ilbo Case were the most unfair and cruelest in the modern history of trials involving press. The militarists have victimized the progressive daily to put a Red scare on the nation and to show that they are devoted anti-Communists. But, Koreans and the world shall not leave such outrage at large.

Sentences

Cruelest Penalty in History. The eyes of both home and abroad were focused on the ROK Revo'utionary Trial of the Minjok Ilbo Case. Amidst the broad attention, verdicts on the 13 defendants of the Seoul progressive daily were passed on August 28. Although expected, the severe sentences were shocking none the less The panel of four military judges pronounced death sentences to the daily's publisher Cho Yong-Su, auditor An Shin-Kyu and advisor Song Ji-Yung. Four other staff members and another defendant were given prison terms ranging from 15 to 5 years while 5 others were acquitted.

The tribunal, in its decision, judged that the defendants had violated the 6th Artic'e of the Retroactive Law to Punish Specific Offenses, enacted by the military regime. With this new law which Koreans call the "cruelest law in modern history", the military tribunal has thus committed the most brutal suppression of free press in modern history. Even during the colonial rule of Japan, many newspapermen were imprisoned and tortured but none ever faced capital punishment.

A "National Tragedy". Vivid accounts on the courtroom scene were reported by foreign wires: "When the sentences were pronounced, family members of the defendants wailed in their seats. Publisher Cho remained motionless, while advisor Song and auditor An smiled cynically. An un-identified person in the spectators seat cried: "This is a national tragedy"

The nation shuddered before the severity of the verdicts. Immediate reactions, however, arose from all quarters of the country, protesting the cruelty and asking for leniency. But before going into the reactions, it is necessary first to lay bare the unfairness and the arbitrariness of the trial.

Investigation

Anti-Communist Propaganda. No sooner than they took over the government on May 16, the militarists cracked down on the Minjok Ilbo and arrested all its officers. On May 22, an announcement titled "The Crimes of the Minjok Ilbo and Publisher Cho Yong-Su" was issued by the Security Bureau, which launched the militarists' anti-Communist propaganda through the victimization of this one and only one progressive Seoul daily. The announcement charged: "'Publisher Cho and his colleagues, under the direction of Yee Young Keun, who served as secretary to Cho Bong-Am and escaped from a hospital to Japan while under bail with espionage charge, have endulged in the work to unite the progressive leaders and parties and have been publishing the progressive organ which advocated peaceful unification of the nation. The aforementioned Yee has supplied 200 million hwan of political funds received from the Chosen Chong-Ryun (pro-Communist General Federation of Korean Residents in Japan) to such pro-

gressive leaders as Chang Keun Sang; advocated peaceful unification proposed by the puppet regime (North Korean Government) and united the progressive forces of the country to endorse the socialist line. Moreover, Yee provided another 100 million hwan of illegal funds and established the Minjok Ilbo which began publication on February 12, 1961. Publisher Cho and auditor An became leaders of the paper and have worked actively to attain the objectives proposed by the puppet regime. Chang Keun Sang, Cho Yong-Su and An Shin-Kyu have already been arrested." (From Hanguk Ilbo, May 23 issue)

Rehashing of the Case. The Minjok Ilbo Case, is no new case. The militarists merely rehashed it. The case, as a matter fact, produced quite a commotion during the previous Chang Myun Government, only to be dismissed. It was kicked up in the House of Representatives last January by an Anti-Red Youth Corps representative by the name of Kim Jun Soep. Kim asserted that Yee Young Keun was scheming to start publication of the Minjok Ilbo by sending pro-Communist Chong-Ryun funds to Cho Yong-Su and a certain representative. He also charged that a secret message (in connection with the establishment of the Minjok Ilbo) from Yee to a certain person was seized by the authorities, but top officials of the government had smothered the incident without prosecuting it. The Chang Government, by no means, left the Minjok Ilbo alone as Kim accused. It, in fact, despatched prosecutors and security agents to Japan thrice to investigate into the matter. The investigation could not, however, uncover any evidence of funds coming from the pro-Communist Chong-Ryun nor any proof that Yee was a fellow traveller. Nevertheless, the Chang Government stepped up its crackdown on the Minjok Ilbo by suspending, on March 3, the government-controlled Seoul Shinmun (newspaper) to print Minjok Ilbo's papers.

Resurgence of the "Secret Message". Now, the militarists, in their campaign to discredit the previous government, accused the Chang Myun Government of collaborating with the Communists by providing conveniences to the Minjok Ilbo. They charged that former justice minister Cho Chae Chun, home affairs minister Hyun Suk Ho, and Hyun's succesor Shin Hyun Don and prosecutor general Yi Tai-Hi of the Chang Cabinet had put pressure on the investigators and suspended the investigation of Yee's Secret Message which was seized at Kimpo Airport by the police. And the militarists publicized the "Secret Message" so as to create an impression as if a serious plot to communize the Republic of Korea through accumulation of the progressive forces and overthrow of the government was contained in it. Such preposterous allegations were put on Chang and his ministers in mid-June following their arrests.

What exactly has happened to this Secret Message? It has mysteriously disappeared and nothing is heard about it anymore. According to the militarists' announcement, the original copy was handed to the recipient thanks to the pressure put on by the top officials of the Chang Government, but a photo copy should remain somewhere. Despite such fact, not a word was mentioned about this message in the indictment presented by the prosecution on July 29.

This, naturally, gave rise to suspicions. But, former justice minister Cho Chae Chun put an end to all the mystery. He clarified, at the Minjok Ilbo trial, the valuelessness of the message for the prosecution, and testified that the message, on the contrary, was evidence enough to prove Yee Young Keun had no connection with the pro-Communist Chong-Ryun. (Court reports by Chosen Ilbo, Aug. 5 issue)

Deadlock of the Investigation and Transfer of the Case to Revolutionary Prosecution. Inspite of their propaganda, the militarists discovered the difficulty of bringing an indictment against the Minjok Ilbo through ordinary procedures. For, they found out that none of the suspects were connected with Communists and in-

SENTENCES

Defendant	Age	Position at Minjok Ilbo	Law applied	Sentence	Demanded
Cho Yong-Su	32	publisher	Art. 6. Retroactive Special Law and Art. 30 of Criminal Law	Death	Death
An Shin-Kyu	43	auditor	〃	〃	〃
Song Ji-Yung	47	advisor	〃	〃	〃
Lee Sang-Du	30	editorial writer	Art. 6. of Retro. Spec. Law and Art. 32 of Criminal Law	15 years	15 years
Lee Kun-Ho	45	〃	〃	10 years	5 years
Yang Su-Chung	41	editor-in-chief	〃	〃	5 years
Yang Sil-Keun	30	shipmate	〃	5 years	Death
Chung Kyu-Keun	32	director	〃	〃	5 years
Lee Chong-Yul	52	former editor-in-chief	〃	Acquitted	〃
Cheun Sung-Taek	41	vice manager	〃	〃	〃
Kim Yeung-Dal	49	business director	〃	〃	〃
Cho Kyu-Chin	39	employee	〃	〃	〃
Chang Yun-Keun	41	woman	〃	〃	〃

vestigations showed that Yun Ke-Seong and another Kim arrested as suspects for bringing in the Yee funds, were innocent. Furthermore, investigators could not dig out any evidence to brand Yee Young Keun a North Korean spy or prove that he had received money from pro-Communist Koreans in Japan. They couldn't connect Yee with the progressive leader Chang Keun Sang either, which necessitated the investigators to cut Chang off the case. And the documents and letters seized from the Minjok Ilbo office didn't provide any evidence. The fruitlessness of the investigation annoyed the junta leaders. But, should the case result in a fade out, that would be a vast embarrassment for the military regime. In this line of thought, the junta leaders decided to transfer the case from the security authorities to the Secret Service and entrusted the indictment of the paper to the Revolutionary Prosecution.

Prosecution

Emptiness of the Indictment. Without facts, even the notorious Secret Service or the Revolutionary Prosecution could not cook up much. The indictment given by the Revolutionary Prosecution to the Court on the opening day of the hearings on the case was an empty bag in want of material evidences.

The indictments read: "Publisher Cho, receiving funds from Yee who has fled to Japan during trial at Seoul Higher Court on charges of espionage, established the Minjok Ilbo to promote the objectives of the puppet group," and "through editorials, news and commentaries carried in the paper, advocated fake peaceful unification formulas identical or basically similar to those of the North Korean Government and promoted North-South exchange of trade, culture and letters as well as student conferences in defiance of the policy of the ROK government, whereby Cho has propagated and encouraged the objectives of an anti-state organization." The other main suspects An and Song were accused of meeting Yee in Japan and of encouraging and collaborating with anti-state activities through their cooperation in the establishment of the Minjok Ilbo. The other suspects were charged with helping the leaders.

"Since these activities violated the 6th Article of the Retroactive Law to Punish Specific Offenses, the suspects had to be indicted" said the indictment. And, Yun Gil-Choung, Ko Chung-Hoon, Lee Do-Ha, Choi Keun-Wu and Cho Jai-Chun were

No Communists. The defendants of the Minjok Ilbo Case were found guilty of "encouraging and collaborating with the policies of Communist North Korea with knowledge to serve the interests of that group." The decision is truly outrageous for none of the defendants are Communists. The Korean Times of Seoul wrote in its editorial of August 30: "The alleged affiliation of the convicted Minjok Ilbo officials with Communist agents for the purpose of overthrowing the government is debatable. As individuals, the accused belong to the fluid burgeorsie, not to the Communist proletariat. It might as well be assumed that they were inclined to follow international neutralists." The convicted had never associated themselves with Communists. On the contrary, they have always been devoted anti-Communists.

Cho Yong-Su (death). Cho, 32 year-old publisher of the newspaper, is a well known anti-Communist. During the Korean War, young Cho threw aside his studies at Yeonhi University, joined the police forces in his home town and fought in the wipe-out operations of North Korean Communists in that sector. In 1951, Cho crossed to Japan to continue his studies at Meiji University in Tokyo. As the War was still going on, violent North vs. South conflicts were being raged among Korean residents in Japan. Cho threw himself into the ranks of the pro-ROK forces and serving such positions as organization committee vice-chairman of the Mindan, editorial writer of the Mindan organ and vice-president of the Mindan Tochigi Prefecture Branch, he always placed himself at the forefront of the fight against the pro-Communist Chosen Chong-Ryun. Cho is particularly remembered here for his leadership in the struggle against repatriation of Koreans to North Korea. In 1959, he led the signature-collecting drive to save the life of Cho Bong-Am, the two-time progressive Presidential candidate executed by Syngman Rhee on false count of Communist collaboration. Returning to South Korea in 1960, Cho ran in the July general elections on a Socialist Popular ticket. After so much pains and trouble, he finally got the Minjok Ilbo published in February this year. Socialists of South Korea are considered nor more radical than Laborites of Great Britain or Social Democrats of West Germany. Since Communism is but a phantom in South Korea, it can easily be understood that Cho and his colleagues of the Minjok Ilbo have been preyed upon by the militarists as sacrifices to be burned at stake in the name of anti-Communism.

An Shin-Kyu (death). An, the daily's 43 year-old business auditor, hails from North Korea. He had worked with the Japanese-managed Manchurian Railways, for which reason, he had to flee from the Communists at the termination of World War II. He crossed the 38th parallel with his aged mother on his back and settled in Seoul. When the Korean War broke out, An immediately joined the marines and fought the Communists throughout the war. These

called as witnesses, while account books, contracts, newspaper files, letters (An to Yee, Cho to Choi) of the Minjok Ilbo were presented as material evidences.

(Note) Article 6 of the Retroactive Law: *Those leaders of political parties or social organs who committed insurrectionary activities including praise, encouragement, and collaboration with those activities, with a knowledge that those activities would benifit those anti-state groups, will be meted out with severe punishments of more than ten years up to death.*

Disappearance of the Communist Fund Story. The charges listed in the indictments literally diminished in comparison to the original allegation. Firstly, the much-propagated "Yee Secret Message" is not even cited. Secondly, Yee is not a pro-Communist any more, and. therefore, the charges of receiving Chong-Ryun funds have completely disappeared. The prosecution now tried desperately to link the Minjok Ilbo with Communism by

bitter experiences have taught him what Communism really is. Returning to business, he succeeded in building up a flourishing textile merchandising firm. His talents in business management were enlisted by the Minjok Ilbo.

Song Ji-Yung (death). Song, 47 year-old advisor to the Minjok Ilbo and president of the advertising agency Hanguk Jeon-Tong, is one of the foremost novelist-journalists of Korea. And as chairman of the Korean PEN Club, he is known throughout the world. During Japanese rule, Song fled to China where he engaged in freedom-fighting. Captured by the Japanese militarists, he was shipped to Japan and imprisoned in Nagasaki prison. The atomic blast would have annihilated him lest he were not transferred to a more remote prison in Isahaya. After Liberation, Song put aside politics and entered the field of journalism. He has since served as lecturer at Seoul National University and Jungang University, editor-in-chief of Kookchae Shinmoon and also Chosen Ilbo.

Song, too, has no Communist affiliation in his personal history. The prosecution accused him of being arrested twice for alleged Communist collaboration. This was in 1949 and 1951, but both cases were dismissed as groundless. If Song had leanings towards Communism, Syngman Rhee wouldn't ever have allowed Song to go abroad as the South Korean delegate to the meetings of the International Writers' Organization.

Song's involvement with the Minjok Ilbo is not anything intriguing as the militarists have charged. On his trip to Japan last year, Song met Yee. The talk was purely on business matters concerning Song's plan of setting up a television station in Seoul. Song's advices to Cho, too, were mostly on technical matters. At any rate, this talented man who has served so much for the independence and culture of Korea, is going to be sent to the gallows so wantonly.

Lee Sang-Du (15 years). Editorial writer of the Ilbo and lecturer at college. During the Korean War, joined police forces and participated in wipe-out operations of Communist forces. Is an anti-Communist.

Yang Su-Chung (10 years). Editor-in-chief of the Ilbo: After Liberation, has worked 15 years as reporter for conservative newspapers and news agencies. Is a professional journalist.

Lee Kun-Ho (10 years). Editorial writer of the Ilbo and university professer with doctors degree of law. Went to the United States on exchange programme of college professors; represented Korea at various international conventions and is a well known authority on ROK penal law. Has no connections with Communists.

Chung Kyu-Keun (5 years). Director of the Ilbo; worked as interpreter for the U.S. forces and also as a court clerk. Is a conservative by political sentiments.

Yang Sil-Keun (5 years). A professional seaman.

branding Yee a North Korean espionage agent. The Yee Young Keun Case which tried to pin Yee as a North Korean spy, cooked up by the Syngman Rhee regime back in 1951 was dug up again. The prosecution charged that "Yee, fleeing to Japan, filtered the ranks of the Mindan (ROK Residents' Union in Japan) and is advocating the objectives of the North Korean puppet group through the publication of Tong-Il Choseon Shinmoon (Newspaper for Korean Unification)" And thirdly, the prosecution backed down from the initial allegation that the Minjok Ilbo operated under the direction of North Korea and merely accused the suspects of propagating political lines similar to those of North Korean government through editorials of the progressive organ.

Trial

Yee Young Keun Espionage Story: Fabrication by Syngman Rhee. At the outset of the trial, the defense attorney

pleaded jurisdictional incompetency of the court. The defense argued that since Minjok Ilbo was a registered profit-making corporation and, therefore, definitely not a social organ, it was quite illegal for the Revolutionary Court to handle the case. The Court, however, ruled, as shown in its decision, that the Minjok Ilbo can be interpreted as a social organ. Prohibition of magnified and analogical construction of law against the interests of the defendant is the basic principle of criminal procedure codes. The military judges in this manner, have revealed their full ignorance of law. At any rate, the hearings proved that not one of the defendants was a Communist, which indicated the irrelevance of the charge that the suspects were pro-Communists just because they advocated peaceful unification. And next, not a single evidence was produced to show that Yee Young Keun was a North Korean spy.

Back in 1951, Yee was arrested by the security authorities of the Syngman Rhee regime, and was demanded a death penalty along with 8 other defendants. Yee had never associated with Communists, and on May 26 of the following year, was acquitted by the Pusan District Court. Since all Communists and fellow travellers were dealt severe punishments, as it was war-time, the acquittal of all the defendants by that court is evidence enough to disprove any pro-Communist allegation against Yee. All Koreans know by now that the incident was cooked up by the Rhee faction. Rhee sought to discredit his rival in the Presidential election, Cho Bong-Am, then vice-speaker of the House of Representatives. As Yee was serving as Cho's secretary, Rhee ordered his army intelligence officer Kim Chang-Yong to frame a Communist espionage story on Yee. Through prosecutor's appeal, Yee's trial was continued at the Seoul Higher Court. Then in January 1958, Cho Bong-Am was arrested on false charges of spying for the Communists, at which time, Yee was convalescing in a hospital. Bedside questionings by the prosecution was performed on Yee which indicated immediate dangers of getting arrested again. As he had already been demanded a death penalty in the first court, gallows alone would wait him if rearrested. So Yee fled the hospital and came to Japan. (This history on Yee's exile to Japan was carried by the Yomiuri Shimbun of Tokyo in its Oct. 27, 1959 issue) Since exile, Yee has set up the Korean Unification Problem Research Institute in Tokyo and through the publications of the Japanese vernacular weekly "Tong-Il Choseon Shinmoon" and the English monthly "One Korea," has been working solely for unification of Korea. Yee has had no connection whatsoever with the Chong-Ryun. The Chong-Ryun instead has often obstructed his activities.

The defense of the Minjok Ilbo Case, therefore, emphasized the point that Yee was no North Korean agent. (Korean Press, Aug. 12) And without conviction, no lawyer is said able to make such assertions in South Korea today.

Deliberate Concealment of the Alleged Fund Carrier. A preposterous thing occured during the trial. A character by the name of Cho Chong-Su appearing in the prosecution's indictment as the fund carrier from Yee to Cho was deliberately made to escape. When the defendants were arrested, the man was in Seoul and believed to have been detained by the investigators. But after release, he fled Seoul and nothing more is heard about him. If Cho Chong-Su had really been the carrier, he would have served as the key witness for the prosecution although he would have had to be tried as a co-defendant. The Hanguk Ilbo reported on August 11 that this deliberate trick of the prosecution was exposed when the defense served a subpoena on Cho to testify in Court. But the Court dodged the lawyers' pursuit insisting that he was unlocatable.

Decision

Ignorance of Criminal Procedure Codes. Still this Cho Chong-Su was referred in the Court's decision as the

TEXT OF THE COURT'S DECISION

SENTENCES

The Tribunal 2 of the Revolutionary Court sentences defendants, Cho, Yong-Su, An Shin-Kyu and Song Ji-Yung to death; defendant Lee Sang-Du to 15 years in prison; defendants Yang Su-Chung and Lee Kun-Ho to 10 years in prison; and defendants Chung Kyu-Keun and Yang Sil-Keun to 5 years in prison. (Verdicts on the acquitted are omitted)

REASONS FOR THE DECISION

1. Facts

Defendant No. 1, Cho Yong-Su while working for the clemency movement to save the life of Cho Bong-Am in Tokyo, Japan in mid-August of 1959, frequently contacted Yee Young Keun, former secretary of Cho Bong-Am, who escaped to Japan on January 19, 1958 while on bail during trial for charges of spying under the direction of the North Korean puppet regime back in 1951. After discussing with Yee on plans to merger all the progressive parties of ROK and to set up a progressive organ taking advantage of the political chaos and disorder in Korea, returned to Korea on Sept. 16, 1960 and joined the Socialist Popular Party led by Yun Gil-Choong. Cho entered the July 27 general elections as Socialist Popular candidate for the House of Representatives, spent 22 million hwan of the total of 46.5 million hwan sent to him through a carrier Cho Chong-Su by Yee Young Keun for election funds and gave 14 million hwan of the margin to Yun Gil-Choong at the direction of Yee Young Keun. After failing to be elected, Cho met with progressive leaders Yun Gil-Choong. Su Sang-Il, Yi Dong-Hwa and Choi Keun-Wu several times in Seoul and discussed the necessity to unite the progressive parties and to set up a progressive organ to promote North-South exchange of politicians, businessmen, and trade for attaining Korean unification. On Nov. 4, 1960, Cho again crossed to Japan, reported to Yee Young Keun on his activities and received Yee's promise to procure funds for mergering progressive forces and setting-up of a progressive organ. Returning to Korea on Dec. 4, Cho received funds, amounting to 38.1 million hwan from Yee Young Keun carried to him by Cho Chong-Su and in late January of 1961, discussed with Su Sang-Il, Yun Gil-Choong, Ko Chung-Hoon, Choi Keun-Wu, An Shin-Kyu and Yi Dong Hwa in Seoul and reached an agreement to establish the daily Minjok Ilbo Incorporated as the organ of the progressives with Cho Yong-Su as publisher, An Shin-Kyu as auditor and Su Sang-Il, Lee Chong-Yul, Lo Chung-Hoon, Choi Keun-Wu and Yun Gil-Choong as directors. The Minjok Ilbo was registered on Jan. 25, 1961 and since its first issue on February 16, issued 35,000 copies daily up to May 16, 1961. Through editorials, commentaries and news carried in the paper, Cho advocated neutralist policies and North-South exchange of letters, trade and culture and student conferences to bring about unification with the knowledge that such activities would aid the North Korean puppet regime and despite of the fact that these policies were similar to the so-called peaceful coexistence policies which in truth are indirect aggression: The North Korean puppet regime is waiting for the opportunity to communize the Republic of Korea by constantly propagating fake policies of mutual exchange and assistance between Koreans. By thses acts, Cho has encouraged and collaborated with the activities of the North Korean puppet regime. (Facts on the other defendants omitted)

2. Evidences

The Court recognizes that the confiscated Account Books, Contract File and Newspaper Files of the Minjok Ilbo, Letters between Shin Yoeng-Min and Song Ji-Yung, Letters between Yee Young Keun and An Shin-Kyu, Letters between Cho Yong-Su and An Shin-Kyu, exhibited by the Prosecution, as evidences since these exhibits coincide with the relative points indicated by the prosecution and also verify the facts presented.

3. Ruling on the Defense's Claim of Jurisdictional Incompetency

The Defense's claim that the trial of the defendants of the Minjok Ilbo does not fall under the jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Court since the Article 6 of the Retroactive Special Law which stipulates anti-state specific offenses of leaders of political parties and social organizations cannot be applied to the Minjok Ilbo as it is not a social organization, has been reviewed. It is obvious that the Minjok Ilbo does not fall in the category of social organization in the narrow sense but the Court must rule that the Minjok Ilbo does fall in the category of social organizations in the broad sense. As to whether the social organizations referred to in the Article 6 of the said law are social organizations in the broad sense or narrow sense, the Court judges that in view of the fact the all organizations performing social activities produces vast effects on the society, it is obvious that the purposes of the Law is to punish also those leaders of these organizations in case they have committed anti-state offenses stiputated in the said Law and, therefore, the social organizations referred in the Law are social organizations in the broad sense. From this standpoint, the Minjok Ilbo, although a commercial organization with purposes of profit-making, in its social functions, possesses social purposes of an organ of speech and, therefore, operates as an organization performing social activities, whereby, it falls in the category of the social organizations referred to in Article 6 of the Retroactive Special Law. Therefore, the Defense's claim of jurisdictional incompetency must be rejected.

4. Laws Applied (omitted)

5. The Acquitted (omitted)

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fund carrier from Yee to Cho. It's no wonder such an irresponsible Court should randomly perform magnified and analogical construction of law beyond the limits of the principle of "punishment by law". The judges, thus, impudently argued away that "the Minjok Ilbo, despite a commercial organization by law, was a social organization since it's social functions are obviously those of a social organization, thereby violating the 6th Article of the Retroactive Special Law." (Hanguk Ilbo, Aug. 28) This definitely is no trial according to the procedures of law.

Such being the case, the Court's decision resulted in a blue-print copy of the prosection's indictment. More than that, the Court, on top of passing capital punishments on three officials of the paper, gave two defendants heavier penalties than demanded by the prosecution!

Comments

Murder in the Name of State. As long as a revolutionary trial is to be performed in accords with the law, the court cannot ignore the principles and limitations set by law. But the Revolutionary Court has defied this iron rule through its complete disregard of the grand principle

of "punishment by law". It pushed through the question of its jurisdictional incompetency by magnified and analogical construction of law and passed sentences without due support of evidences. No lawyer would call this a trial in the modern pattern. This is murder in the name of the State.

Treason Against Democracy and Nation. Death sentence on newspapermen by court in legal issues involving the press is unheard of in modern history. It is all too clear that the Minjok Ilbo Case is the most atrocious suppression committed on free press. The verdicts are an enbodiment of the coup regime's policy to annihilate the unification forces. It can be said that the militarists have committed a treason against democracy and the nation by trampling on the freedom of speech and unification which is the long-cherished aspiration of all Koreans. The militarists have shamelessly burned the Minjok Ilbo at the stakes to show the foreign powers that they are full-fledged anti-Communists.

Still some Koreans would say that the Minjok Ilbo had abused freedom let loose after the April Revolution. But, was it an abuse of freedom to advocate unification in this land where everybody is crying at the tragedy of having the fatherland split in two? And why should the Minjok Ilbo have made allowances in its attacks on the corrupt and inefficient government under which the nation was suffering so much? The Minjok Ilbo had worked solely for the interests of the nation. Such criticisms, therefore, are mere gibberish of those who have fattened under the corrupt governments at the expense of the people's sufferings.

Save the Condemmed! It is needless to say that the severity of the sentences given to the Minjok Ilbo defendants and, therefore, this brutal assault on free press is an urgent matter which all Koreans willing to unify their fatherland must censure. Moreover, it's a big problem which all who respect rule by law and democracy cannot leave alone. The incident must not be put aside as a trifling event in far-off Korea. History has proved that deseases that poison the conscience of mankind have tendencies to spread, and those who make use of the poison have always fallen victims to the same deseases. Therefore, it is highly necessary for the world as well as Koreans to rise in protest against this most outrageous trial.

Reactions

At Home. Criticisms against the severe penalties immediately arose in the homeland. Presses requested in unison for leniency. The Korea Times requested in its editorial: "Newspapermen have never been given death sentences by the court in legal issues involving the press. Inasmuch as those accused are presumably not avowed Communists but professional men of bourgeoise origin, we deem it advisable for the authorities concerned to offer them an extenuation of the circumstances and a chance to repent and serve the nation anew."

Abroad. The International Writers' Organization representing over 7,000 writers throughout the world appealed on Aug. 30 for clemency for its PEN member Song Ji-Yung. The International PEN's secretary general David Carter sent this appeal by telegram to Park Chung Hi, Chairman of the military junta. On the following day, Japanese PEN Club also wired an appeal to Park for mercy toward the three ROK journalists. A nation-wide campaign to protest against the death sentences was also launched in Japan by critics, writers, journalists and also editors of such big dailies like the Asahi, Mainichi and Yomiuri Shimbuns of Tokyo.

Notice

Although One Korea is being published monthly on schedule, we would like to have our Readers know that we had to move the date of publication a month ahead to Oct. 1, 1961 in order to meet the 3rd Class Mail requirements of Japan. News, therefore, up to the middle of the previous month of publication date will be carried hereafter. (Editor)

SOCIALIST GIVEN DEATH SENTENCE

On the heels of the death sentences passed on the officials of the newspaper Minjok Ilbo, the Revolutionary Court rapped on Sept. 14 a death penalty on a leader of the defunct Socialist Party and sentenced five other officials of the party to prison terms ranging from 5 to 15 years on charges of "anti-state" activities. This brought the total condemned to death by the Revolutionary Tribunal up to 8 persons (as of Sept. 14) while 2 were given life imprisonment, 32 given prison terms, 6 put on probation and 12 acquitted among 60 defendants.

The following are the defendants of the Socialist Party and the sentences they recieved:

Choi Park-Keun, party agenda chief	Death
Ha Tae-Whan, party spokesman	15 years
Moon Hui-Choong, chief secretary	"
Lee Suk-Choong, branch official	10 years
Yu Han-Choong, party planner	7 years
Kim Yung-Ok, local official	5 years
Chin Byong-Ho, student chief	Acquitted

The revolutionary prosecution, by the way, had demanded death for Choi and life term for Ha and prison terms ranging from 10 to 15 years for all the other officials.

The defendants were found guilty of having promoted the purposes of the North Korean Communist regime and agitated the political chaos following the uprisings in 1960. The progressive politicians were also charged, in the verdict, of committing "anti-state" activities of opposing the economic pact between the Republic of Korea and the United States and also demonstrating against the legislation of the abortive Anti-Communist Special Law and the Demonstration Control Law presented by the previous government. Their open support of the North-South Student Conference which eventually did not come about, too was counted as an violation of the 6th Article of the Retroactive Special Law to Punish Specific Offenses.

Immediate reactions criticizing the severity of the sentences and inaptness of the trial again arose from the public. Socialists of Korea are considered no more radicals than Laborites of Great Britain. The defendants have worked for progressive and labor movements but none have any connection whatsoever with Communists. Choi, the condemned, participated in forming the Labour Party in post-Liberation days and worked for unification only to be purged by Syngman Rhee. He returned to politics following the April uprisings last year and became a leader of the newly formed Socialist Party. Ha used to be a teacher before entering politics. He belonged to the Progressive Party until it was disbanded in 1956. After the fall of Syngman Rhee, Ha participated in forming the Central Council for National Unification and also joined the ranks of the Socialist Party. The others have more or less similar personal histories void of any collaboration with Communists.

At any rate, no one, with a sensible mind, can call the charges listed in the Court's verdict "anti-state" activities. The Socialists acted within the limits of constitutional rights. Unification and North-South exchange, which the Court charged as Communist collaboration, as a matter of fact, was the call of the times and were also the platform of all conservative parties as well as endorsed by every press in South Korea. In branding the Socialists "anti-state" and pro-Communist, the militarists have fully exposed their undemocratic nature defying the fundamental rights and their anti-nationalism denying the inherent rights of national self-determination. It must be reiterated that the militarists are committing murder in the name of the state.

YU CHIN-O and KIM YU-TAIK

TOP CIVILIANS IN THE COUP REGIME

Yu Chin-O, Director of the "National Movement for Reconstruction" and **Kim Yu-Taik,** Vice Premier and Chief of the Economic Planning Agency, are the two top civilians enjoying the greatest esteem in the South Korean military regime.

When Dr. Yu, an authority on ROK constitution, accepted the post, Koreans nodded in despise: "Sure he's perfectly fit for the job." In days under the Japanese dictator Tojo, patriotic Yu proposed at an academic meeting, total destruction of the Korean language and literally astonished the Japanese scholars. The accomplishments of Yu as a scholar and artist, therefore, can easily be measured, but his ways as a worldly man far surpass any fellow Korean.

After Liberation Day (Aug. 15, 1945), this little man immediately began calling at the homes of Communist leaders. But, as soon as the Americans arrived in Seoul, he worked into their favor, and when the first Syngman Rhee government was born, Yu, in time, became a bureau chief in the Justice Ministry. Then he was dispatched to serve as long-term representative on the Korean delegation to the ROK-Japan Talks. On the birth of the "Second Republic", he was promoted to the post of Chief Delegate to the Talks by Chang Myun. And finally the military coup did not devour him either He must be an invincible man.

Kim Yu-Taik, is no inferior to Dr. Yu as a worldly man. Under the Japanese rule, he used to work as a faithful clerk at the Bank of Korea. After Liberation, he soon became an officer of the Bank being liked by the Americans. Then singled out by Syngman Rhee, he was put on his way through such important posts as Vice Finance Minister, President of Bank of Korea and Ambassador to Great Britain. He maintained his ambassadorship during the Chang government and finally, on July 22, was requested to take over the highest current civilian post of Vice Premier and Chief of Economic Planning Agency.

No Korean will forget that Kim is one of the authors of corruption during the Rhee regime. As President of Bank of Korea, he conspired in profiteering with Premier and Finance Minister under Rhee, Pek Du-Jim, who was labeled No. 1 illicit fortune-maker in Korea. Well may it be that the first job Kim undertook on assuming his new post was to get the illicit profiteers including Pek whom the militarists had arrested in the very outset of their regime, freed. His skill on economic planning, however, seems really bad, for South Korean economy is but slipping down the road to collapse.

The militarists have advertised so loudly that they were bent on rooting out corruption and reconstructing the national morals. But since they have singled out such characters to lead and reconstruct the nation, it is easy to imagine what kind of "new and conscientious politicians" the militarists have in mind to transfer the government to.

UNIFICATION ADVANCING IN JAPAN

The May 16th military coup d'etat brutally strangled the South Korean unification movement which had mounted to great heights. On top of such atrocity, the militarists have now sentenced 3 officials of the Seoul daily Minjok Ilbo to death just for the sake of advocating peaceful unification which was the call of the times during the Chang Myun administration. The terrifying situation in the homeland have, however, brought the 600,000 Korean residents in Japan closer together and the unification movement here is making big steps forward.

More than 450 Korean businessmen. students, artists and youths representing both pro-North Korean and pro-ROK organizations gathered on August 14 at Prince Hotel in Tokyo and celebrated Liberation Day. Speakers at this unprecedented North and South joint celebration called in unison on the ROK military regime to put an end to its oppressions on the South Korean people. A declaration was issued at this meeting which pledged "to continue the struggle for peaceful unification, recalling the exultation experienced on Liberation Day 16 years ago and also by accumulating all the energies of the nation together."

A similar joint celebration was held on August 13 at New Grand Hotel in Yokohama attended by 250 Koreans representing various North and South circles in that area. On the same day some 50 Korean scholars and journalists assembled at Sankei Hall in Tokyo and exchanged their studies and research works on the unification problem.

The series of these celebrations was highlighted by the North-South Joint Cultural Festival which took place at Kyoritsu Auditorium in Tokyo on August 20. Over five thousand Koreans gathered there and feted Liberation. Colorful Korean



Joint Celebration at Prince Hotel and (below) Joint Cutural Festival—scene from "Black Footprints"

dances, music and drama were presented by local Korean artists. The audience was especially impressed by the performance of the drama "Black Footprints" which portraited the dark and dreary life in South Korea under Syngman Rhee regime. Meanwhile, an appeal was also issued at this festival which requested Koreans "to unite, regardless of political sentiments, as one nation and to work in gaining an independent and peaceful unification of Korea."

Not more than a year and a half ago Koreans in Japan split in two exactly like the fatherland were cutting at one another's throat. These successful supra-partisan get-togethers, therefore, are great leaps forward in the cause to reunify the divided nation.

APPEAL

Issued by the Korean Residents' Cultural Council for Promoting Peaceful Unification and North-South Exchange on Aug. 20 at Tokyo.

Today, we have gathered under a single roof to celebrate our Liberation Day. The sixteen years that have passed since was filled with great challenges and vast changes. But the nation's aspiration to reunify the divided territory and to bring forth prosperity to our children has never been forgotten.

Now, why must we Koreans, who had embraced each other in exultation and made our hearts leap at the moment of our liberation, have to go on with our fatherland split into two countries? And why must we, when the space age has been opened to mankind and all the rest of the world is exchanging free travel, have to live apart without knowing what has happened to our own brothers and sisters? This is all because we have not gained unification.

Peaceful unification of the fatherland! This is the long-cherished aspiration of all Koreans. Unification however, shall not be thrown into our laps nor can it be done by the power of a single soul. Unification is the sublime task of the nation which must be won by incorporating all the forces of the nation together. Korean brethrens in Japan, regardless of the differences in poltical sentiments, faith and organizations, must join hands and rise to make the way for peaceful unification of the fatherland.

We, members of the Council, have risen here to attain this big goal, and pledged to advance by singling out understanding rather than distrust, point of unity rather than antogonism, and thus break through the walls that hinder our way to unification.

Through the "March 1st Rally" and the "April 18th Joint Cultural Festival", we have drawn big reactions from both home and abroad. The success had encouraged us to form the Korean Residents' Cultural Council for Promoting Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland and North-South Cultural Exchange.

The road to unification is steep. We must not rest our foot or ease our determination. At this very moment when we are rejoicing in our celebration, the fatherland is still divided and the barriers to unification still remain. And, particularly, those lion-hearted youths who had cried "Let's go North, come to South Korea! " and "Let's meet at Panmunjom!" last April, are presently pounding on the thick walls or prissons in South Korea.

Still, no matter how heavy the dark clouds above us may be, there will always be a new and bright morning awaiting us. In order to make this bright morning come early, we must unite and march on. Renewing this determination, we here appeal:

1) We will oppose Korea being drawn into further wars and actively work in gaining an independent and peaceful unification of the fatherland free of any intervention by foreign powers.

2) We will oppose any maneuvering to impair or suppress the peaceful unification and demand assurance of freedom of speech, publication and association and also all other democratic rights.

3) We, regardless of our political sentiments, will unite and expand th lofty work to gain peaceful unificat and also develop the culture of nation.

NEWS OF THE MONTH Aug. 1 to Sept. 15

Unification Leader Dies in Prison

On the evening of Aug. 3, Che Kwun-Nu. leader of the defunct Socialist Party and chairman of the disbanded Central Council for Promoting Independent National Unification, passed away in prison. Che was arrested by the junta immediately after the May 16th coup. His family had repeatedly asked for bail on grounds of old age and illness but was bluntly refused by the authorities. His death had been kept secret until a witness at the recent trial on the Minjok Ilbo Case exposed the tragical death. The nation was shocked on June 14th in knowing that aging Dr. Lee Hun-Kyu, United Socialist council had succumbed in prison and it must now mourn the loss of this long-time independence fighter against the Japanese, who was fighting at the forefront of the struggle to reunify the torn nation.

Park Announces on Government Turnover

On August 12, Park Chung-Hi chairman of the Supreme Council announced the military junta's plan on restoring civilian rule. He made clear that (1) turnover of the government to civilian control is planned to be in the summer of 1963; (2) the Constitution will be amended; (3) the presidential form of government will be restored; (4) the National Assembly will be single-chambered with 120-160 seats; (5) elections will be thoroughly managed by public management of the government and (6) a law will be enacted to prohibit corrupt and dishonest politicians from returning to politics. "Two years is a long time" was the immediate reaction and strong calls for swift restoration of civil liberties were also heard.

Gov. Tightens Hold on Local Governments

A provisional law on local autonomy was promulgated on Sept 2. This law deprived local autonomy functions of the Seoul and nine provincial governments as they will operate under the direct control of the central government. The law will come into force beginning Oct. 1 and also calls for a regrouping of county units so that each county has an average population of 100,000. This tightening of reigns on the local self-government, together with the infringement on the autonomy of universities and reshuffling of 280 judges throughout the country on Aug. 27, show clearly that the militarists are going to eliminate even these little bits of democracy remaining in the various institutions.

Students Indicted on Pro-Communist Charges

On Sept. 8, nine Seoul collegiates were put on trial by the military government on charges of having engaged in pro-Communist activities. The students were leaders of the defunct Students' League for National Unification, which had been formed by Seoul students during the Democratic regime. At the first trial session, the prosecution charged that the students had advocated political lines similar to those of the North Korean regime. They were accused of planning a North-South student conference and also of opposing the economic pact between ROK and United States. Their opposition and demonstrations against the legislation of the Anti-Communism Special Law and Violence Control Law were also charged as anti-state activities. The defendants are consisted of four Seoul National University students and five other colleges. Severe penalties are expected.